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offered as a means to provide some comfort for consumers about the quality advice that they might 
receive, yet the challenge remains about what is meant by ‘quality’ in this area. By referring to recent high 
profile collapses, we describe some factors and features that are generally considered as examples of 
poor quality advice. In this manner, we offer bounds on what quality can be represented by, and outline 
factors that can be considered by individuals when assessing the quality of any service being offered. 
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Individuals face a number of financial and non-financial risks over their lifetime, especially 
concerning implications of longevity and adverse health. These risks can be exacerbated by a 
combination of complex rules and a large number of options for financial wellbeing, low levels 
of financial literacy, and a growing shift away from government- and employer- provided 
support towards greater self-sufficiency in retirement. 
As such, the need for professional financial advice is apparent for many individuals. 
However, recent cases have highlighted the high levels of distrust that many people have in the 
delivery of such professional advice, complicating the provision of financial wellbeing further 
for those who would otherwise benefit from informed and impartial advice. 
Recent regulatory proposals and debate have centred on various aspects of what constitutes 
‘good’ advice, couched in terms of a ‘best-interests’ duty from the adviser to the customer. 
However, financial advice is essentially a credence good whose value is hard to assess, which 
presents a real challenge in being able to determine what is meant by ‘quality’ and ‘best 
interests’ in terms of advice. 
By referring to recent events and in particular the high profile collapse of Storm Financial, 
we describe in this paper some features that are generally considered as examples of poor quality 
advice. We use a qualitative methodology, based on data sourced from a Parliamentary Inquiry, 
as well as interviews with ex-Storm advisers and investors. In doing so we offer bounds on what 
quality can be represented by, and outline factors that can be considered by individuals when 
assessing the quality of any advice being offered. 
 
THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL PROVISION IN AUSTRALIA 
 
In this section we outline the main features of the Australian system of financial provision, 
particularly in regard to saving and living throughout retirement. We begin with an overview of 
the ‘system of pillars’ of retirement saving, and then discuss the issues of complexity, the trend 
to self-sufficiency, and the importance of and shortfalls in financial literacy. 
 
A system of pillars 
 
Financial security in Australia, in the context of savings and provision over a lifetime and 
particularly for retirement, is essentially built on a system of ‘pillars’. The first of these is an age 
pension, which is subject to two means tests – one based on assets, the other based on income. 
The pension payment is at the rate which is the lower that results from each of these two tests, 
with the full age pension rate generally accepted to be close to a rate that could provide for a 
modest lifestyle (RWA 2012). A second pillar is a mandatory retirement savings scheme, paid as 
employer contributions that are currently a minimum of 9.5% of salary. Pillar three consists of 
voluntary and private savings, with any contributions at the discretion of individuals, and/or 
employers. Via the use of advantageous tax breaks, there is strong encouragement for these extra 
savings to be allocated into superannuation accounts (Taylor and Wagland 2011). 
Alongside the growth of superannuation savings arising from the SG has been the decline 
in employer-sponsored defined benefit (DB) schemes. In contrast to DB schemes, the SG is 
primarily a defined contribution (DC) system, which specifies the level of contributions made to 
an individual’s superannuation fund(s). Investment choices reside with the individual and with 




no pensionable income being specified, the ‘sufficiency’ of a DC scheme in terms of retirement 
income is not a responsibility of sponsors.  
 
Complexity, choice and self-sufficiency 
 
The Australian financial system is considered to be very complex, due to many factors relating to 
tax; changes and choices within superannuation and its interaction with the other pillars; 
insurance options and platforms3; the structuring of debt arrangements4; and aged care provision 
which depends on factors such as assets, income, and the required standard of care (Chardon 
2011, McKee 2010, RWA 2012). Such complexity is also prevalent in other countries, and is 
given much attention by various commentators (for example, Bodie et al. 2008, MacDonald et al. 
2011, Warren 2006). 
The fact that various aspects of the pillars and their interaction have changed over time 
and/or have been signalled that they may change in the future complicates the picture further5. Of 
particular interest is the requirement for individuals to be actively involved in making a range of 
choices for their financial wellbeing. In DC schemes choices must be made concerning fund and 
investment allocations whilst saving, as well as how to manage and utilise these savings whilst in 
retirement (Beshears et al. 2011, Bodie et al. 2008, Gallery et al. 2011, MacDonald et al. 2011). 
The availability of choice for individuals is considered effective only if individuals appreciate 
and can make appropriate investment and risk-related decisions (Bateman et al. 2010; 2011a), as 
much more risk now has to be absorbed at an individual rather than collective level (Warren 
2006). 
A consequence is the need for individuals to now be far more self-sufficient for their 
overall financial wellbeing, particularly in Australia (Smith 2009). This does not just apply to 
how and through what mechanisms an individual can save for retirement - though this is clearly 
important – but the more encompassing issue is how they provide for their requirements over an 
entire lifetime. This is more an issue of smoothing one’s income earned whilst working, and 
indeed, is the central question of life-cycle finance (Siegel 2008). It infers a lifetime of 
responsibility on the individual for decisions relating to all of saving, investing, and spending 




One definition of financial literacy is ‘the ability to make informed judgments and to take 
effective decisions regarding the use and management of money’ (ASIC 2003), which requires 
an individual to make decisions and modify their behaviours in a way that is financially 
advantageous to them (Chardon 2011). This includes planning over longer rather than shorter 
time periods (Campbell 2006), making appropriate choices regarding superannuation funds and 
investment options (Gallery et al. 2011), having a working appreciation of the time value of 
                                                 
3 The primary options in terms of personal coverage concern life, total and permanent disablement, trauma, income 
protection cover, health and general insurances, with some life insurances available within as well as outside of 
superannuation. 
4 This includes house, car, investment, and personal loans, credit cards, and other consumer purchase arrangements 
such as hire purchase. 
5 For example, the age of eligibility for the Age Pension is to increase to 67 progressively from 2017, and this itself 
will be reviewed again in 2023 (RWA 2012). 
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money, and appreciating the advantages of risk pooling mechanisms such as with insurance (Fear 
2008).  
What is apparent is that despite today’s world of financial choice, complexity and self-
reliance, levels of financial literacy are generally considered to be low, given the responsibility 
that individuals must bear (Iannicola and Parker 2010, Widdowson and Hailwood 2007)6. It is 
specifically in the area of risk where a lack of financial literacy is particularly apparent (Bateman 
et al. 2011b, Lusardi and Mitchell 2011, Smith 2009). 
Whilst many researchers, policymakers, industry commentators and the industry itself may 
bemoan a general lack of financial literacy, perhaps it is not surprising that such levels of 
financial literacy exist. One reason is that although people have familiarity with money, there are 
limitations to what can be learned from one’s own financial experiences. This is because each 
person only goes through each life stage once, and when decisions relate to a long term horizon it 
is often difficult to assess the worth or otherwise of such decisions. Furthermore, what is 
available to individuals in terms of financial products and options can rapidly change, meaning 
that previously acquired knowledge can be quickly out of date. As such, many individuals are 
not likely to ever attain critical levels of financial literacy (Beshears et al. 2011) and many 
individuals are essentially ‘involuntary’ investors, who are being asked to make important 
decisions in areas for which many have no experience or indeed interest in (Gallery et al. 2011). 
A second factor concerns a lack of willingness to engage with such decisions. In the face of 
much choice and complexity, individuals can simply avoid an issue altogether, or simply revert 
to default options because that requires less effort. An example of avoidance is that many 
Australian baby boomers conduct little planning for retirement in addition to minimum SG 
contributions (Hunter et al. 2007). This avoidance of longer term plans for retirement needs is 
also reflected in other findings (Collins 2010; Iannicola and Parker 2010). 
Also of interest are the actual behaviours and influences that emerge when individuals have 
to make financial decisions. The conventions of economic theory have been to assume that 
individuals make decisions to maximise their utility, based on a trade-off between risk and 
return. Yet from behavioural research it seems that individuals apply differing levels of 
importance to potential gains and losses, which themselves differ depending on their assessed 
likelihood (Bateman et al. 2010, Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Weber et al. 2011). Many other 
behavioural insights have been suggested since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) ground-
breaking paper in this field, including confirmation bias, and resorting to heuristics or simple 
rules of thumb when faced with complex choices. 
 
THE ROLE OF ADVICE 
 
It is apparent then that many individuals may not make good financial decisions if left to their 
own means (Mullainathan et al. 2012), particularly given the complexity that prevails today 
(RWA 2012). As such, many individuals seek help for various aspects of their financial affairs. 
The obvious point of call for assistance is professional advisers, but there are also a number of 
non-professional sources. These are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
6 Major financial literacy surveys in Australia include a 2007 telephone survey of 7,500 Australians conducted on 
behalf of the Financial Literacy Foundation (FLF), and four surveys conducted on behalf of the ANZ (2002, 2005, 
2008, 2011). 




Non-professional sources of advice7 
 
People often utilise multiple non-professional sources of information to help with their financial 
decision-making (ANZ 2008). Those originating from social interactions can include family 
members, friends, work colleagues, and other peers. 
Sources from more personal-oriented investigations can include media (such as the 
opinions of finance experts in newspapers, magazines, radio and television), publications directly 
from the finance industry, books, and government publications. Many sources such as the 
Product Disclosure Statements (PDS) of superannuation funds may be quite specific to a 
particular issue.  
A further source which has grown in significance in recent years is the internet. Investors 
can now have much information as promptly as industry professionals, they can enter financial 
transactions independently of a professional if they choose to, and it can be done more cheaply 
than before (Smith 2009).  
Although the range and variety of non-professional sources plays an important role and in 
some cases may be helpful, there are also risks. The first of these is that these sources may not in 
fact be providing appropriate advice. Indeed, if an individual has not been able to work out the 
advantages and disadvantages of certain decisions for themselves, relying on others who 
themselves may not have done so simply exacerbates the problem. In this sense the impact of 
peers may be as much a hindrance as a help. 
Generational differences are also likely to be influential, with what was good advice 
twenty years not necessarily the case today. The use of the internet as a research tool can 
exacerbate these risks, where additional financial information can lead to individuals becoming 
over-confident, thinking they have greater knowledge than what they actually do have. This can 
lead to other apparent biases such as optimism and in particular, an illusion of control (Smith 
2009). 
A further risk relates to the uniqueness of each individual, with levels of family support, 
attitudes to risk, testamentary intent, belief(s) and attitudes towards retirement differing between 
individuals (McKee 2010). And, although some non-professional sources may provide specific 
guidance for specific issues, such advice is unlikely to be individualised for someone’s particular 




The Australian Financial Planning Association (FPA Australia) describes financial planning as 
‘developing strategies to help you manage your financial affairs and meet your life goals’8. This 
is essentially an interaction of goals (such as retirement) and beliefs (such as perceptions of 
money), with multiple functions required of a financial adviser in order to provide such a service. 
According to Kliplin (2010), an adviser should provide strategic advice9, tactical advice10, an 
                                                 
7 References for this discussion include: FLF 2008, Gallery et al. 2011, Iannicola and Parker 2011, McAlexander 
and Scammon 1988, Mullainathan et al. 2012, Ntalianis and Wise 2011. 
8 http://www.fpa.asn.au/default.asp?action=article&ID=22724, accessed 22 March 2013.  
9 Coaching and guiding individuals through various life changes. 
10 Expertise on insurance, investments and superannuation, as part of an individualised plan. 
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implementation of decisions made, and then help keep individuals on track to achieve their 
financial goals. Similar functions are suggested by others11. 
Financial planning is a relatively new profession, emerging from origins in life insurance 
sales, and some services offered by accountants, lawyers, and investment brokers (Cowen et al. 
2011, Hunt et al. 2011, Santacruz 2011). From such relatively narrow specialties it continues to 
morph into a distinct service, though debate exists as to whether it is truly a ‘profession’ (Cowen 
et al. 2011, Murphy and Watts 2009). 
A range of non-pecuniary benefits are associated with financial advice, and these are 
considered as important as any other benefits that might accrue to the customer (Collins 2010, 
Hunt et al. 2011, McKee 2010, RWA 2008). If an adviser operates as a financial coach to help 
the customer be aware and enabled to set specific goals and have an associated plan, then this 
can provide peace of mind (Kliplin 2010). If done realistically and comprehensively, this can 
provide the customer a degree of control as well as financial protection against unforeseen 
events, such as death or disability (RWA 2008). As such, those using financial advisers may be 
more engaged with their finances, allowing them to make informed decisions and willingly take 
responsibility for those decisions – in other words, empowering the client (Hunt et al. 2011, 
Kliplin 2010). 
 
The difficulty of assessing value 
 
Financial advice, however, is essentially a credence good with its quality being hard to assess 
(Bluethgen et al. 2008). This is also exacerbated by the complexity of the underlying issues that 
financial advice pertains to (FSA 2009). One major issue in discussing the quality of advice is 
the temporal nature of outcomes arising from that advice. The long term implications of financial 
decisions are significant and given the associated aspect of risk, this can mean that a focus on 
short term financial benefits can be inappropriate (Collins 2010). However, this itself opens up a 
number of issues.  
Very poor advice and decisions can certainly lead to significant losses and poor outcomes 
in the short term, and these should not merely be waved away due to a fallback on ‘it is the long 
term that matters’. And, it can also lead to spurious claims about the effectiveness of advice and 
quality of decisions, notably due to the cherry-picking of convenient data12. But, it is also the 
case that even when high quality advice may have been given, there may not necessarily be 
evidence in the short term of the quality of that advice. Whether it is the purchase of a product 
whose quality is not immediately obvious, or if advice is given to forego current consumption, it 
                                                 
11 Financial planning occurs through “thorough collection and impartial analysis of information on the factual and 
affective dimensions of a person's or family's total financial situation; the identification of needs and the 
establishment of specific financial objectives; and the formulation, implementation, and continuous monitoring of a 
comprehensive financial plan to achieve them” (Johnson 1983, cited in McAlexander and Scammon 1988, p.185). 
12 For example, “it would not be unreasonable for many intelligent people… to believe there are very few financial 
professionals who lose. With so many possible measures of performance, it is difficult not to find one that looks 
good… (we were) presented with the record of a noted investment professional which showed below-average 
performance over the past 1, 5, and 10 years. Performance over the past 15 years, however, was above average. This 
was described as being noteworthy evidence that the professional was not interested in quick results but was 
investing for the long term” (Allen et al. 2000, p.429). 




can be difficult for the consumer to assess whether advice is sound within short time frames 
(Iannicola and Parker 2011)13.  
The nature of financial outcomes also means that the results of advice are necessarily ones 
of probability, not certainty. In the context of institutional portfolios, Hedberg (1973) 
humorously points out that quality measured solely by a single result involves uncertainty “in a 
field where chance can, for a time, make a hero out of a fool, or a goat out of a conscientious 
analyst” (p.24). In other words, sometimes given advice may work out well, and sometimes it 
may not. 
Another issue concerns the nature of ‘product’ versus ‘strategic’ advice, which is given 
significant attention by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC 2014). 
Strategic advice considers broad requirements like the required level of retirement savings, 
sensible borrowing levels, investment risk appetite and appropriate amounts of insurance, 
separate to any recommendation for which product would be appropriate to implement the 
strategy. ASIC’s view is that there is often an imbalance between the priority given to financial 
product advice, compared to strategic advice, as indicated in their significant review of retail life 
insurance advice (ASIC 2014). For many consumers, it is possible that there is not any obvious 
delineation between ‘product’ and ‘strategic’ advice. 
Hence there are many difficulties when assessing the quality of financial advice, and it 
generally has to involve a qualitative judgement (Weatherhead 2009). As such, this means that 
the value of financial advice can be relatively intangible to some consumers14, and can be 
complicated further when determined by a consumer’s own subjective judgement15. 
 
FOFA AND ‘BEST INTERESTS’ DUTY 
 
Following the collapse of multiple financial entities over 2006-2009 in Australia, an Inquiry was 
launched by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(henceforth referred to as the PJCI). The findings of the PJCI were released in November 2009, 
with 11 key recommendations that touched on issues of regulation, training, education, 
professional standards, and adviser remuneration. Following these recommendations, a range of 
reforms (Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) reforms) for the financial planning industry were 
promulgated and then confirmed by the Australian government. Three key reforms included: 
 The banning of commissions to all but risk-only insurance products; 
 A requirement for advisers to get clients to opt-in (renew) their advice   
  agreement every two years; and 
 A statutory fiduciary duty for financial advisers to act in the ‘best    
  interests’ of their clients (Commonwealth of Australia 2011). 
 
The response from the financial services industry was mixed, with concerns about some 
reforms being cumbersome, unnecessary, increasing the compliance burden, and having a bias 
                                                 
13 “Financial advice is not like hiring a plumber, in which the immediate and concrete benefit of the service is a 
fixed sink… the benefits of financial advice are delayed” (Iannicola and Parker 2010). 
14 “If clients can touch it, feel it or see it, they know exactly what they’re buying… but in professional advisory 
services, you never have the advantage of allowing the client to ‘kick the tyres’ the way sellers of products do” 
(Wijetllake 2012, p.24). 
15 As an additional analogy, with professions such as medicine there is good practice which nevertheless can result 
in undesirable outcomes, but there is also practice which can be professionally negligent. In financial affairs, it may 
not be straightforward for a disgruntled client to differentiate between the two. 
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towards some segments of the industry (RiskInfo 2011). Although the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia agreed that the reforms will help remove conflicts of interest and 
improve the overall quality of financial advisory services, it also cautioned that the reforms had 
limitations (ICAA 2010). It called for a focus on the key drivers of quality in the context of 
financial advice, including higher education standards, the incorporation of  practical and ethical 
components within such education, and importantly, “an overarching culture of operating in the 
public interest” (ICAA 2010). 
 
What is ‘best-interests’? 
 
Having a ‘best interests’ duty is complicated by the combination of factors discussed to date. 
Where the quality of advice itself is hard to assess, the financial literacy of investors themselves 
is not especially cognizant of risk, and the financial landscape in Australia is complex, then 
knowing what ‘best interests’ is represented by is not a straightforward task.  
One starting point is to consider guidance under recent regulatory settings, most obviously 
through the Corporations Act (2001) (Commonwealth of Australia 2001) and the Financial 
Services Reform Act (2001) (FSR) (Commonwealth of Australia 2005). Under the FSR, minimal 
regulatory intervention is seen as an appropriate approach to strike a balance between consumer 
protection and the capacity for markets to deliver innovation and efficiency. As such, risks exist 
for the customer because they can choose product(s) which are unsuitable for their 
circumstances, including those with features that they may know little about or are not in a 
position to manage effectively. Where personal financial advice has been given, the requirements 
and indeed obligations on the adviser boiled down to three key elements, that were expressed in 
the Corporations Act (2001), s945A(1). These were to: 
 Understand the customer’s relevant personal circumstances in relation to the 
advice being given; 
 Give careful consideration to whether the advice is reasonable in all of the 
circumstances obtained above; and 
 Ensure that the advice is appropriate to the customer, given those circumstances. 
 
In other words, an adviser had to know their customer, know their product, and ensure that 
the product was appropriate for that customer. Such advice had to be ‘reasonable’ and 
appropriate, and it provided an obligation on the adviser to specify advice specific for the 
particular customer. Nevertheless, ‘appropriate’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘best 
interests’, with the latter intended to be a stronger requirement.  Indeed, ‘best interests’ is 
described as requiring a financial planner to act in the best interest of the client in relation to the 
advice (FPA 2013), rather than the less stringent test of reasonableness that previously applied.  
The original FOFA reforms incorporated into the Corporations Act a series of steps that 
when followed, intended to show that the best interests test had been met (Corporations Act 2001 
s961B(2)(a)-(g)). Subsequent reforms to the provisions by the Coalition Government removed 
s961B(2)(g) from the Corporations Act, which was a broader clause focusing less on process 
than the previous steps. There has been considerable debate amongst industry groups, 
practitioners and the legal community as to whether the removal of s961B(2)(g) results in a 
lower level of protection to consumers. Some groups argue there is no practical impact (Holley 
2014, Stewart 2014), whereas others describe its removal as leaving only a checklist-based 
process that weakens consumer protections (ISA 2014). Indeed, ISA (2014) highlights that 




although the remaining subsections (a) to (f) are important, they “do not even mention a client’s 




It can be difficult then to establish what is truly meant and ultimately intended by ‘best interests’. 
What we offer is to highlight features of advice arising from a specific case study (Storm 
Financial), which indicates what is not meant by ‘best interests’. In this manner, we suggest that 
there are at least bounds on what ‘best interests’ could be seen to be, which serves as a signpost 




Queensland-based Storm Financial was a financial advice company which collapsed suddenly in 
late 2008 / early 2009. The losses for its 14,000 investors were significant, with total reportedly 
in the region of $3 billion (St. John 2011)16. Storm’s investment model required investors to 
source funds from superannuation, the sale of personal assets, other savings, and new mortgages 
against the home. Against the accumulation of all of these an additional margin loan was often 
also taken, with this strategy to both mortgage the home and take out an additional margin loan 
referred to as ‘double gearing’ or ‘leverage on leverage’ (Ferris 2011, Smith 2009). The margin 
loans were usually provided by Macquarie Bank or subsidiaries of the Commonwealth Banks of 
Australia (CBA) (Barry 2009, Ferris 2011). All subsequent funds arising were then available for 
investment into an equity-based index fund. Over time investors were encouraged to increase the 
absolute size of their investment, in line with growth in the equity investment and house values 
(Barry 2009). Investors were mainly retirees, or those close to retirement. As such and given the 
leverage involved, many investors lost not only their investments but also their homes and entire 
life savings, and many were also left with large debts in the form of home mortgages and/or 
loans to providers of margin loans.  
 
Data and methodological overview 
 
We make use of the significant qualitative data that is available concerning the collapse of 
Storm, as an informative case study. As part of the PJCI there were numerous submissions, 
public hearings and public commentary made on the circumstances and lessons of the collapse. 
We also sourced 13 individual participants (a participant is either an individual or a couple) who 
were Storm investors, and 2 ex-Storm advisers, for personal interviews which took place over 
2011 – 2012. Through presentations and some publicity amongst other investors, we also 
received additional correspondence throughout this research, providing another insightful data 





                                                 
16 The exact figure is disputed, with ASIC (2012) claiming that “the total loss suffered by all investors who 
borrowed monies from financiers to invest through Storm to be approximately $832 million…ASIC does not know 
of any reliable source for the $3 billion loss figure”. 
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Table 1: Summary of data sources 
 
Source of Data17 Description Volume of data 
Submissions to 
PJCI 
Anyone with an interest in the 
purposes of the PJCI could make 
a public submission. 
398 publicly available submissions, 
constituting 2,879 pages of written 
material. 
Public hearings of 
PJCI 
Public hearings were held as part 
of the PJCI throughout Australia 
in 2009. 
Nine public hearings, with 40 distinct 
parties (106 individuals) appearing 
and giving testimony, giving rise to 
823 pages of written transcripts. 
Interviews 15 interviews with ex-Storm 
investors and ex-Storm advisers 
took place over 2011-12. 
21 hours of recorded conversation, 
and 402 pages of interview 
transcripts. 
Observations Observations were taken at 
interviews; and observations of 
many commentators are available 




Various feedback was 
received from other parties, 
arising from presentations and 
earlier production and distribution 
of 2 industry journals18. 
Written comments from eight 
financial advisers and seven 
additional ex-Storm investors; 
numerous verbal feedback and 
insights. 
 
Deducing key findings from such a large quantity of qualitative data is not straightforward, 
and demonstrating the validity and credibility of these findings is also challenging. The approach 
adopted to draw out key findings was based on elements of grounded theory and narrative 
analysis, and ensuring that these findings represent a reasonable series of insights into what is 
resident within the underlying data was enhanced through the use of several procedures 
considered to be reasonable in the qualitative research literature. This included the use of 
participant quotations, peer review, purposeful sampling, thick description, member checking, 
triangulation, and mechanically recorded data. To place this in context, engaging in at least two 
out of eight named key procedures is considered reasonable19. A full discussion of strengths and 
weaknesses of such qualitative approaches, the detail of the analytical steps taken, and the 





                                                 
17 Public Submissions and transcripts of public hearings can be sourced from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/Completed
_inquiries/2008-10/fps/index 
18 Presentations have included those to: ANU colleagues (2011, 2013); a US Society of Actuaries conference (2011); 
an academic, actuarial and regulatory audience at the University of Auckland (2012); MLC financial advisers 
(2014); the Actuaries Institute Financial Services Forum (2014); and the ACT branch of the Statistical Society of 
Australian (2014). The two industry papers produced early in the research were: ‘Surprises from Storm’ (Journal of 
Financial Advice August 2012), and ‘Aftermath of a Storm’ (The Australian Journal of Financial Planning March 
2013). 
19 These are (a) prolonged engagement and persistent observation, (b) triangulation, (c) peer review or debriefing, 
(d) negative case analysis, (e) clarifying researcher bias, (f) member checks, (g) thick description, and (h) external 
audits (Creswell 1998, cited in Anfara et al. 2002, p.30). 




ESTABLISHING BOUNDS ON ‘BEST INTERESTS’ 
 
In terms of submissions made to the PJCI, 14 out of 43 public submissions from financial 
planning businesses and seven out of 21 financial service organisations / institutes / associations 
documented some concern about the overall strategy offered by Storm. The major areas 
commented on were risk levels and tolerance, assumptions underlying the investment strategy, 
the use of the one-size-fits all approach, the use of debt, and the self-selection aspect of investors 
joining Storm. We also consider that ‘concentration risk’ is highly relevant. We give an overview 
of the specific concerns expressed about Storm’s strategy, using a selection of views from the 
available data, to inform the debate about what is represented by a ‘best interests’ duty20. 
 
Risk levels and tolerance 
 
Two aspects of risk were highlighted. The first of these was that the overall level of risk was 
inappropriate and too high given the likely tolerance levels of the target market of more mature 
investors. The Institute of Actuaries of Australia bluntly asserted that the strategy adopted, ‘on 
any objective test, is inappropriate and involves an excessive level of risk, given their 
circumstances’ (submission 319). Various financial advisers also offered a critique, one stating 
that the advice was ‘grossly irresponsible’ due to the predominance of investors near ‘the end of 
the wealth accumulation stage of their lives’ having ‘no prior exposure to the stock market or 
indeed leveraging’ (submission 332). In other words, and according to another financial adviser 
company, ‘they simply took no account of the clients’ financial risk tolerance’ (submission 324). 
A second aspect of risk concerned the communication of that risk to investors. Storm 
offered all prospective investors a series of education seminars, to equip investors with a good 
understanding of all aspects of the investment (Dias 2009). Attendance was a general 
requirement prior to making a decision to proceed, and the process could take up to six months. 
Ferris (2011) states that these educational seminars were lengthy and had supporting written 
material, including 100-page long statements of advice21 which, unfortunately, many investors 
‘did not understand’. AXA’s submission (385) to the PJCI also commented on this issue: 
 
It seems unlikely that so many people would have mortgaged the family home, their only asset, if 
they had understood that there was a significant risk that they could lose it as a result of a decline in 
investment markets. 
 
Assumptions underlying the investment strategy 
 
Many observers commented that Storm’s advice model was predicated on a poor understanding 
of market fundamentals. One financial company stated that the overall failure was due to the 
assumption of ‘the Stock Market continuing to “bull run”’ (submission 330), and fairly blunt 
                                                 
20 It is noted that Storm’s founder, Emmanuel Cassimatis, gives a defence of many aspects of Storm’s strategy to 
PJCI members in the Brisbane public hearing of 3 September 2009. An ex-Storm adviser presents a similar case in 
the Cairns public hearing of 1 September 2009, with his overall view that the key issue is not one of Storm’s 
strategy but rather the action(s) of the behaviour of the CBA, a key credit provider associated with Storm’s advice 
model. 
21 However, although some risks were given in writing, these were “apparently undermined by verbal assurances 
from the trusted Storm advisers. The Storm investors were repeatedly assured that their homes were not at risk” 
(Ferris 2011). 
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assessments were also provided by other financial planners (for example, submission 168). 
Another financial adviser observed that it was the combination of underlying beliefs about the 
market, with other risk factors within the Storm model that represented the real crux of the risk at 
play: 
 
No planner worth their salt should claim to be able to pick the timing, or even frequency of share 
market volatility. Where a client presents though at close to the end of their working career, 
without other significant financial resources, there are enough knowns to tell a good planner that a 
gearing (and double gearing on top!) strategy is not appropriate. (email from financial adviser, June 
2013) 
 
It is opportune here to highlight one aspect of the basis underlying the investment strategy, 
as put forward by Storm. We refer to the following excerpt: 
 
Senator McLucas: What did the (education sessions offered by Storm) cover? 
Mr Cassimatis: It covered technical aspects of finance, the psychology of investing, accounting 
principles, financial principles and risk. Specifically, because our space was leverage, it gave 
explanations as to how wealth can be enhanced significantly using leverage, and it also gave quite 
horrific examples of how equity gets destroyed when markets are negative, but then in the end it is 
the averages that count. (Brisbane public hearing of 3 September 2009, p.22)  
 
It may be that the reference above to the primacy of ‘average returns’ is meant to highlight 
that such strategies require a long term rather than short term horizon and as such it is long term 
trends that are more important than shorter term fluctuations. Other than the risks involved with 
gearing, with such an inference we have little issue. If however there is a belief that a long term 
average returns are what count most of all, then this misses the key point of risk.  
A simplified example makes this clear. Suppose a strategy starts off with $100 of assets 
and $x of liabilities by way of margin loan (to give net assets of $(100-x) and a loan to value 
ratio (LVR) of x%), and that at the end of each year the overall position is rebalanced, through 
extra loans for further investment, to maintain that LVR of x%. Then, consider two scenarios: 
 
(1) returns are +20% per annum for 9 years and then -50% in year 10; 
 
(2) returns are +9.94% for each of 10 years 
 
Both cases have the same 10-year average geometric return. Yet, the relative net positions 
after 10 years vary enormously under various LVRs, as per the following: 
 
Table 2: Outcomes of investment scenarios with margin lending 
 
LVR (%) Net position (assets minus 
liabilities) after 10 years under: 
Difference between outcomes, 
expressed as a % of the net assets 
held at t = 0 Scenario (1) Scenario (2)
40% +$133 +$278 242% 
50% $0 +$307 614% 
60% -$384 +$368 1,880% 
70% -$1,985 +$525 8,367% 
80% -$15,360 +$1,130 82,450% 





Notably, to focus on the differences in LVRs in terms of investment outcomes, this 
analysis assumes an interest rate of 0% on the margin loan itself. With an interest rate of 
approximately 10% on the margin loan, then the higher the LVR, the more pronounced also this 
interest burden would be. Clearly, any geared strategy can be under severe stress unless it is very 
conservative, and merely an average return being reasonable says nothing about the underlying 
risk involved. Yet, the ten-year annual geometric return of +9.94% for both scenarios is 
attractive and in any appeal to a long term horizon, the associated risks may not be understood, 
or may be underplayed.  
 
One size fits all 
 
Another criticism was the use of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy whereby the same model of advice 
and product was given to investors, regardless of their personal circumstances (Barry 2009, 
Ferris 2011, Smith 2009). The inappropriateness of this was not necessarily the product itself in 
isolation, but the matching of the product with those for whom it was unsuitable. For example, 
those with low incomes would be at the mercy of adverse interest rate movements on the loans, 
and particularly for those who had ceased work, this risk was exacerbated (Smith 2009). 
Furthermore, despite a long term investment horizon being more appropriate for Storm’s model 
of high levels of debt in conjunction with large up front commissions, the target market was 
predominantly retirees or those close to it. The additional high levels of gearing on that debt 
make for a risky overall concoction, yet such highly geared strategies were recommended to 
those who could ill-afford it (Ferris 2011). And, even if all the above criteria were satisfied by a 
particular investor, that investor should also have a high level of knowledge of the intricacies and 
detail of the overall strategy. Yet this too was unlikely in many cases, particularly with respect to 
the risks posed by the leveraging strategy (Smith 2009).  
The fact that Storm’s founders and ex-Storm advisers also suffered from their own 
personal losses strengthened the criticism in some quarters of the inappropriateness of the 
advice22. The suggestion and adoption of a certain level of risk tolerance and appetite by a 
potential investor is not made more appropriate or credible, simply because the adviser has 
adopted this for themselves23. In this sense, it is an ironic twist that a product can be made more 
appealing via an adviser’s personal assurances, when on closer inspection this is misleading in 
the financial context where investors are not homogeneous agents. In fact, doing so does not 
heed relevant legal and professional guidance to ‘know the client’ and ensure the tailoring of 
advice specifically to that client.  
The issue of advice not being suitable for individual circumstances was widely commented 
on – for example, the CEO of IFSA24 (Canberra public hearing of 28 August 2009, p.53); a 
financial consulting group (Melbourne public hearing of 26 August 2009, p.96); and submissions 
                                                 
22 “The founders of Storm… along with most advisers and key staff, are all in the same boat as some of our clients. 
We have all followed the same investment and lending within our portfolios, have our homes mortgaged and have 
suffered the declines in the markets due to the financial crisis…while this is no consolation, we are sure it proves we 
have not acted differently for ourselves. Being in the front line of course makes us the first casualties” (Storm 
founder Emmanuel Cassimatis, cited in Raggart 2009). 
23 Indeed, “whilst it’s not unreasonable for the baker to say that he eats his own bread it is clearly inconsistent for a 
financial planner to give all his clients a similar and very risky strategy even if it is the same one he has adopted for 
himself” (FinaMetrica 2009). 
24 The Investment and Financial Services Association. 
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154, 293 and 385 from consulting group AEC, a financial planning company, and AXA, 
respectively. Another financial planning business expressed their concern as follows: 
 
They simply offered one solution, which was for clients to borrow heavily against their homes and 
to use this to leverage further into margin loan and invest 100% into Australian shares… (they) had 
a square hole and jammed people into it no matter their shape and size… Storm Financial had 
clients on the Aged Pension and minimal other income signing up to borrow $1 million. 
Irrespective of market conditions, how is that appropriate financial advice? (submission 178) 
 
An ex-Storm adviser commented succinctly in an interview their reflection on not having a 
‘solution for each individual person’, in that ‘you don’t have one solution fits all, that’s bulls---‘. 
Another ex-adviser also commented on this aspect of Storm’s approach: 
 
The one size fits all…that was a problem because they were lumping retirees in with the general 
public and that’s where most of the problems have emerged… the one size fits all obviously, 
clearly doesn’t work. It doesn’t work because the guy in Cooktown requiring $90 a week and being 





Storm’s approach to let potential investors ‘opt-in’ to their commoditised, rather than 
individualised advice offering (with advice effectively ‘packaged’ as a part of the product), was 
also commented on. Indeed, this process of ‘self-selection’ into Storm’s model was the 
mechanism for the ‘one-size-fits-all’ issue arising, but there were subtleties to it that deserve 
mention.  
The FPA’s deputy CEO described the practice of self-selection where ‘clients were asked 
to qualify themselves as being suitable for the strategy’ as ‘very uncommon’. Clients were 
effectively asked by Storm, ‘if you want to achieve these goals and these outcomes then this is 
the sort of client you need to be… (are you) that client?’ In other words, ‘clients were invited to 
qualify themselves into the relationship’, which Senator Mason of the PJCI bluntly assessed as a 
breach of professional expertise: ‘This is a professionalised industry. You cannot let people 
prequalify and determine what they think they are’ (Canberra public hearing of 28 August 2009, 
p.30). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia also picked up critically on this issue, 
with their view that ‘the responsibility still goes back to the adviser and the advice being 
provided’. Further, they added that: 
 
The client may self-select and say, ‘I am interested in going forward with this,’ but in the current 
environment it is still the responsibility of the adviser to provide appropriate advice… part of the 
role of the adviser is to say, ‘This is not appropriate for you.’ …if a person is retired, is paying off 
their home and is elderly, gearing is not an appropriate option, and if the client is saying, ‘This 
sounds great; I want to head down that track,’ a professional needs to take a position and say: ‘No, 










The use of debt 
 
The use of margin lending is one of the more debated issues within the overall strategy adopted 
by Storm. Certainly there was little to support its utility to the extent, market and manner adopted 
by Storm, but nevertheless it was not necessarily considered an inappropriate strategy per se. For 
example, the CEO of MLC Limited stated that margin lending can be ‘an appropriate product’ 
(Melbourne public hearing of 26 August 2009, p.14), a financial adviser stated in email 
correspondence that ‘gearing is a legitimate strategy for the right type of client’ (April 2013), and 
IFSA stated their view that ‘a high level of leverage is, in and of itself, (not) inappropriate for 
retail investors’ (submission 317). 
Furthermore and despite their poor experiences, some interviewed investors still held it to 
be a workable approach in some circumstances, albeit with different parameters to that which 
they had with Storm:  
 
Husband: We’ve got a friend here who is one of the richest guys (locally) and he says, “Quite 
frankly, it sounds like a pretty good scheme to me except you were very unlucky for it to have hit 
the global financial crisis.” 
Wife: And that it was too highly geared…. the model itself would have worked if it had been 
geared at about 25 per cent. (interview with Storm investors) 
 
Another interviewed ex-investor has actually gone into a gearing strategy again, but with 
more conservative parameters. An ex-Storm adviser also continues to attest to the value inherent 
with gearing strategies, but on reflection with more regard being paid to the risks involved: 
 
I used the model well before I got involved with Storm and it works… the issue here was the 
borrowing… it was just far too much… the model unquestionably works if the debt levels were set 
at appropriate levels much more moderate than they were… the level of debt to pensioners, to 
people who weren’t working, was crazy... you either had to be employed, you had to have a very 
good understanding of where we were going… on reflection, gearing for retirees is dumb, right? … 
Now with the benefit of hindsight, it doesn’t work for retirees at the level of debt that was loaded. 
(interview with ex-Storm adviser) 
 
The aspect of risk is therefore a key concern of such arrangements, reiterating earlier 
comments. Despite stating that leverage can be appropriate, IFSA also cautioned that important 
and additional risks are also involved (submission 317), and the CEO of the Association of 
Financial Advisers stated that any margin lending product should be “handled with care”, and 
any double-geared margin lending product should be “handled with serious care’ (Sydney public 
hearing of 4 September 2009, p.42). The CEO of Macquarie Bank also testified that their advice 
to customers includes a statement of the additional and significant risks involved, and 
management thereof: 
 
‘Be conservative in the amount that you borrow, always borrow within your capacity so you can 
accommodate any interest-rate rises, check the lending ratios before implementing the plan, 
diversify your investments, reinvest dividends to reduce your loan as a proportion of your total 
portfolio, make interest payments regularly, ensure that you have stable cash flow to meet interest 
payment obligations, monitor your investments closely, and invest for the long term’. (Canberra 
public hearing of 28 October 2009, p.15) 
 





A major shortfall of Storm’s model that many investors would have been oblivious to is what we 
term ‘concentration risk’. Some interviewees made an analogous comparison of the strategy to 
borrow against both the home and against total investment assets via a margin loan, with that of 
taking out a mortgage for home purchase. Whilst both are similar in that money has been 
borrowed, there is little further common ground. The ability to service a mortgage depends on 
the borrower’s income (and if investment earnings were available, they would be independent of 
that income). In contrast, the ability to service both a mortgage and investment loan under 
Storm’s model predominantly depends on investments held. However, when investment values 
fall and thereby raise the LVR, income from those investments is also likely to fall, 
compromising the ability to service the loans. Depending on the size of money put aside for a 
cash ‘dam’ (as labelled by Storm) to provide for living and interest expenses, a point will be 
breached when servicing the loans themselves is under pressure, adding further pressure on the 
LVRs. In other words, when it rains (investment markets drop), it doesn’t just pour (LVRs 
increase due to decreasing investment values), it actually turns torrential (loan servicing runs the 
risk of being compromised, on both mortgage and investment loans). This does not make such a 
strategy inappropriate for all people, but in all probability it was inappropriate for the majority of 
Storm’s investors. One financial planner made this point: 
 
When you borrow to invest you should have cash flow to support that. Essentially, this model 
borrowed the cash flow, and that is where everything started to tumble down. If I am doing margin 
lending and, indeed, if I am doing double gearing… I have got to have the cash flow to support it. 
The failing here was about borrowing to pay for it as well as to build that wealth to pay for their 
retirement lifestyle. (Cairns public hearing of 1 September 2009, p.95) 
 
Overall, where a defence of the overall strategy has been given (such as in the public 
hearings mentioned in footnote {20}, as well as in submission 281), we note further that: (1), 
those who actually paid out margin loans suffered major losses as well; and (2), the 
concentration risk above would trump most reasonable protective measures in a big enough 
market fall (short of having costly cash ‘dams’ and ratios set at levels so as to render the 
leveraging strategy pointless). Furthermore, although it is clear that the GFC was the catalyst that 
led to Storm’s collapse, this was not the basis for the overall criticism of Storm’s strategy. As the 
CEO of IFSA attested: 
 
The requirement for appropriate advice is significant. We believe that the activities of Storm with 
respect to some of their clients were not appropriate. They did not give appropriate advice. And 




Recent reforms have introduced the concept of a ‘best interests’ duty in respect of professional 
financial advice. The need for quality finance is significant, and as such this reform seems 
timely. Yet, the value of financial advice is very hard to assess, which generates a significant 
challenge in defining and applying what is meant by ‘best interests’, for the benefit of 
consumers, regulators, and indeed advisers themselves. 




By referring to the collapse of Storm Financial as a case study, we offer some further 
discussion on what might be described by a best-interests duty. Some major lessons from 
Storm’s collapse suggest that this duty could, depending on the specific situation, give attention 
to the following key aspects: 
 Risk levels and tolerance of the individual customer. These cannot be   
  merely assumed, especially if risk is not presented in a way which is  
  meaningful to the customer. Neither can it be assumed that the customer   
  applies similar levels of importance to potential gains and losses; 
 Clarity and communication about the underlying assumptions made   
  regarding the investment strategy, particularly regarding the belief of the   
  adviser as to the nature and features of market returns and behaviour; 
 Advice must be individualised to a customer’s explicit beliefs and    
  expectations about risk, and their own goals. Blanket statements,    
  generalised assumptions, and a lack of some defined goal are likely to   
  render a best-interests duty intractable; 
 The use of debt and additional borrowing, in any shape or form, should be  
   replete with warnings about its use in the context of an individual’s own   
  risk appetite and goals; 
 The advice process should allow, and perhaps even promote, the right of   
  the customer to seek alternative advice for either holistic or piecemeal   
  aspects of the advice being offered; 
 The choice to proceed with a certain course of action may be the right of a  
  customer, but this does not obviate the requirement for an adviser to   
  exercise judgement and caution if they believe this is not the best course   
  of action to take, given the risk appetite and goals of the customer; 
 Particular risks reside within certain strategies that may not be obvious to   
  adviser nor customer, such as ‘concentration risk’. It is possible that a   
  best-interests duty could require a mandated element of professional peer   
  review in terms of process, or specific recommendations being made.  
 
We do not believe that there is any ‘silver bullet’ to specify what is meant by a best-
interests duty. Advice itself necessarily involves judgement and it delivers outcomes which are 
probabilistic in nature. However, the key aspects arising from the case study of Storm are that 
personalised advice which explicitly accounts for a customer’s goals and risk appetite is 
essential, as is the relationship between goals and risk, and as is the clear and unambiguous 
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